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 In 1969 Congress adopted the National Environmental Policy Act in response to 
social and environmental activism in the United States.  The subsequent “Decade of 
Environmental Achievement” saw enactment of sixteen major environmental laws in the 
span of eleven years.  As a student at Stanford Law School, I became a witness to and 
participant in the newly developing field of environmental law.  This dissertation sets out 
my personal and professional observations over a period of forty years, accompanied by 
four published works. 
 I begin with the guiding principles of Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the 
Commons” and John Kingdon’s “stream theory” of policy making.  I next examine the 
development of environmental regulations, with a focus on the surface management 
regulations adopted by the Bureau of Land Management and the tension between 
environmental aspirations and private property rights.  We then turn to issues of water 
scarcity and water pollution involving the Truckee River system in western Nevada.  The 
adoption of Superfund and its misapplication is examined in the next section.  My 
presentation to the International Symposium on Society and Resource Management 
regarding the effectiveness of mining regulation in Nevada constitutes the fifth chapter.  
The final chapter compares the effective international response to ozone depletion to the 
present tentative response to global warming. 
 After an exceptional adolescence, the field of environmental law is now governed 
primarily by state and federal agencies and the courts.  It is thoroughly enmeshed in our 
lives, to the point where it is almost inconceivable that there were no significant 
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As a resource and environmental attorney, I wanted to learn more about the process by 
which laws and regulations were adopted.  My studies were interesting and thought-
provoking, and my curiosity has yet to be satisfied. 
 I wish to thank Dr. Herzik for his continuing mentorship and encouragement over 
this eighteen-year process.  I also thank the members of my dissertation committee, 
President Joe Crowley, Dr. John Marini, Dr. Danny Taylor, and Dr. Glenn Miller, for 
their support of my unusual approach to this topic. 
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Historians may someday recall the 1970’s as the Decade of 
Environmental Awareness.  Prior to that time, Americans had accepted 
environmental decay as the inevitable price of technology.  The smog 
index on news reports, the growing length of the Endangered Species 
List, the increasing number of lakes and rivers unfit for swimming – 
these were regrettable effects of “progress,” but less important than the 
gross national product. 
 
The change in attitude came suddenly.  Perhaps the Apollo 
moonflights, with their dramatic photographs of a jewel-like world set 
in the vastness of space, made us aware of the unique beauty and finite 
limits of our planet.  Perhaps the new-born environmental movement 
was an outgrowth of the activism prevalent during the 1960’s.  
Whatever the cause, apathy gave way to “ecology now,” and the 
common sense of urgency was translated into legislative action.  
Beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the 
federal and state governments created the new field of environmental 
law in two or three years.  And today we are witnessing the culmination 
of this movement, as many states declare environmental quality to be 
one of the basic human rights.1 
 
 When I wrote this introduction to Interstate Environmental Problems in 1973, I 
was President of the Stanford Environmental Law Society.  Professor Charles Meyers, in 
his course on environmental law, introduced us to a new statute called the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, with its promise to make the waters of the United States drinkable, 
fishable, and swimmable.2  The Vietnam War was winding down.  President Richard M. 
Nixon had, in a three-year span, signed the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean 
Air Act, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.  Everything seemed possible. 
 My preface optimistically predicted that, “Historians may someday recall the 
1970s as the Decade of Environmental Awareness.”  In retrospect, it was the “Decade of 
Environmental Achievement.”  The extent of environmental activity in the 1970s is 
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dramatically illustrated in Figure 1 on Page 3.  The chart depicts U.S. health and 
environmental protection laws enacted between 1969 and 1980.  (The horizontal axis 
represents a timeline from 1965 to 1981; the vertical axis lists the number of laws enacted 
during this time period.)  Commencing with the National Environmental Policy Act in 
1969, Congress enacted sixteen major environmental laws in the span of eleven years.  
The straight-line plot depicts a remarkable record of environmental achievement. 
 I have been an observer of – and participant in – the development of 
environmental law for forty-two years.  This paper is a retrospective of my personal and 
professional observations concerning this extraordinary period.  I am a practicing 
attorney specializing in resource and environmental law.  I have written and delivered 
numerous articles regarding environmental law.  For seven years I served as Washoe 
County’s appointed member on the Advisory Planning Commission of the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, giving me valuable insights into formation and application of 
environmental policy.  I presently serve as the legal member of the Air Quality Control 
Board of Washoe County.  I have taught environmental law at UNR for seventeen years. 
 When I graduated from UNR in 1969, there were no courses in environmental law 
or environmental science.  Today the university catalog has offerings in nearly every 
college.  The English department offers a master’s degree in environmental literature. 
 Perhaps the best measure of our country’s success in environmental law is the 
mindset of today’s students.  They cannot imagine a time when there were no laws 
regulating and protecting air quality, water purity, waste disposal, and animal species.  





Organization and Published Works 
 This retrospective is divided into six sections.  The introduction constitutes 
Chapter One. 
 Chapter Two is based upon my paper, “Federal Regulators vs. Nevada Miners” 
(1977),3 which deals with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
environmental regulations. 
 Chapter Three is based upon Interstate Environmental Problems, published by the 
Stanford Environmental Law Society in 1974.  It will focus on the Clean Water Act, one 
of the most successful of all U.S. environmental statutes. 
 Chapter Four is based on my article, “Superfund: It Can Happen to You,” 
published in the Nevada Lawyer (1997).4  This Chapter will draw considerably upon my  
Master’s thesis at UNR, “Seek and Destroy: Designation of Potentially Responsible 
Parties under CERCLA” (May 1994). 
 Chapter Five is based on my 2006 presentation to an international audience in 
Vancouver, Canada, entitled “Regulation of Open-Pit Gold Mining in Nevada: A 
Successful Model for Resource Development in the Global Community?”  In fact, the 
“Nevada model” has been adopted to one degree or another by Ghana, the Dominican 
Republic, Australia, Romania, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Peru, Chile, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, and various internal regions of China. 
 In Chapter Six we return to Kingdon’s “Stream Theory” and compare the 




Professional Education and Travel 
 I have developed my environmental outlook through education, professional 
practice, and travel.  I hold a Bachelor of Science Degree in Geological Engineering 
(UNR 1969); a Master’s Degree in Exploration Geology and Mining Law (Stanford 
1975); a Juris Doctor Degree (Stanford 1975); and a Master’s Degree in Environmental 
Science (UNR 1995).  I have been a speaker at many professional seminars relating to 
environmental law. 
 In my travels to seven continents and one hundred twenty countries, I have seen 
the impact of human behavior in unexpected places: 
  — I once misidentified a “granitic textured” rock in Antarctica; it was a block of 
weathered cement abandoned by a long-gone expedition. 
 — In Uzbekistan we travelled through endless fields of cotton, referred to locally 
as “white gold.”  Irrigation of these fields has doomed the Aral Sea, formerly one of the 
four largest lakes in the world.  This “Sea of Islands” has now declined to ten percent of 
its original size. 
  — In war-torn Sierra Leone, West Africa, we visited the Tacugama chimpanzee 
sanctuary.  The unfortunate animals are orphans or rescued “pets.”  The main purpose of 
the high enclosure is to prevent the cage-maddened chimps from killing people. 
 — In Western Sahara, a disputed area adjoining Morocco, the four-lane highway 
leading to the capital city of Laayoune has few cars but many front end loaders which, 
like Sierra snowplows, wage constant battle with the encroaching Sahara dunes. 
6 
 — Our dining terrace in Baku, Azerbaijan overlooked the Caspian Sea.  The view 
included oil derricks stretching to the horizon.  Our caviar was imported: pollution had 
nearly destroyed the classic sturgeon fishery. 
Guiding Principles: Garrett Hardin and Tragedy of the Commons 
 In progressing from science/engineering to law and political science, I have found 
particular meaning and inspiration in two published works.  Appropriately, one was 
written by a scientist and the other by a political scientist.  Both of these works constitute 
core principles of my classes in environmental law and policy. 
 Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968)5 dealt with population 
growth.  Hardin posits a “commons,” a pasture open to all.  The arrangement can be 
sustained for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of 
men and cattle in check.  As the society approaches stability, however, “The inherent 
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy”: 
...[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for 
him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.  And another; and 
another....  But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational 
herdsman sharing a commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit 
– in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes 
in the freedom of the commons.  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all. (Hardin, Page 1244.) 
 
 Hardin expands his viewpoint from a pasture exploited by local herdsmen to the 
larger “global commons” of air, water, and land: 
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of 
pollution.  Here it is not a question of taking something out of the 
commons, but of putting something in – sewage, or chemical, 
radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and dangerous fumes 
into the air; and distracting and unpleasant advertising signs into the 
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line of sight.  The calculations of utility are much the same as before.  
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he 
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his 
wastes before releasing them.  Since this is true for everyone, we are 
locked into a system of “fouling our own nest,” so long as we behave 
only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers. (Hardin, Page 1245.) 
 
 The solution to local, regional, and global issues of exploitation, concludes 
Hardin, is “Mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people 
affected” (Hardin, Page 1247, emphasis added).  Hardin points to parking meters and 
fines as a means of controlling overuse of common space.  We reluctantly accept 
restrictions for the common good. 
To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are 
required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it.  Who enjoys taxes?  
We all grumble about them.  But we accept compulsory taxes because 
we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless.  We 
institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to 
escape the horror of the commons. (Hardin, Page 1247.) 
 
 As we grudgingly pay taxes, we have grudgingly accepted environmental 
regulation of our business and social activities.  Philosophers and political scientists have 
written volumes regarding human rights and freedoms and their moral under-pinnings, 
but Hardin’s terse summation says it all: “Mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.” 
Guiding Principles: John Kingdon and “Policy Streams” 
 My studies and teaching have also been informed by John Kingdon’s “stream 
theory” presented in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (1984).6  As a 
scientist/engineer learning public policy, I was frustrated by the randomness of policy 
development.  Charles O. Jones (1984) had suggested that policy should develop in a 
fairly neat policy cycle: problem identification, development of solutions, legitimation 
(enactment of statutes and ordinances), implementation (including delegation of authority 
8 
to experts and development of regulations), evaluation, and (rarely) termination of 
programs and agencies.7  Jones’ approach indicated that policy development should have 
a beginning, middle, and end.  Furthermore, it seemed that policy development was 
inexorable: consider the explosion of environmental law in the 1970s. 
 On closer examination, however, it appeared that policy develops in a very “hit 
and miss” fashion.  Promising ideas failed to muster public support.  Popular projects 
died in the legislative swamp.  Obscure problems led to international treaties (ozone 
depletion and the Montreal protocol), but rising sea level and coral die-off are met with 
public indifference in the United States. 
 Kingdon proposed that new policies are developed when there is a convergence of 
three “streams” – the problem stream, the policy (solution) stream, and the political 
stream (Kingdon, Page 92).  The streams develop separately and certain events can lead 
to their coupling.  These can include trigger events (such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
which led to the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990) and changes in federal or state 
administration.  A new president with majorities in both houses of Congress is more 
likely to advance new policies (e.g., “Obamacare”). 
 Kingdon’s policy stream consists of ideas floating in the “policy primeval soup” 
(Kingdon, Pages 122-123).  Policy ideas can be advanced by academics, think tanks, 
congressmen and their staffers, media, and agency personnel. 
 The problem stream must be matched by a policy stream to be successful.  (I refer 
to this as the “solution stream.”)  In the same way that policy entrepreneurs advertise 
problems, there are industries and individuals clamoring to solve these problems.  An 
example would be promoters of battery-powered vehicles as a solution to oil dependence. 
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 The problem and solution streams are “coupled” on occasion by ripples in the 
political stream.  Changes in congressional makeup and ideology, election results, public 
opinion, and broad social movements, such as the environmental movement of the 1970s, 
are examples.  A conjunction of the streams can lead to the decision agenda and the third 
stage of the policy cycle, enactment of laws and regulations. 
 I find Kingdon’s multiple streams approach to policy making very satisfying, in 
that it explains how decisions are made (and not made) on a seemingly random basis.  
(Wonderfully enough, Kingdon’s theory developed from his observations of the most 
chaotic political system of all: university governance.) 
 I am a beneficiary of Kingdon’s theory.  In 1968 the new theory of plate tectonics 
unified the diverse fields of volcanology, seismology, structural geology, and even 
geography.  The theory of continental drift was not new, having been postulated by 
Alfred Wegener in 1912.  It took sixty years for the “political stream” to mature and 
allow acceptance of this extraordinary theory, as new generations of scientists became 
willing to interpret old data in a new way.  It was the most thrilling intellectual 




Federal Regulators vs. Nevada Miners: 
NEPA and Environmental Regulations 
 
The concept of “free mining,” whereby a privileged class of men were 
allowed to develop minerals on open lands, arose during the Middle 
Ages and became part of our English legal heritage.  The concept was 
embodied in the 1872 Mining Law, which declares that “all valuable 
mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States…shall be free 
and open to exploration and purchase…by citizens of the United States 
(emphasis added).… Miners thus perceive the BLM [surface 
management] regulations as a threat to their traditional freedom and 
heritage as well as their economic well-being.  It is a situation in which 
emotions run high and dialog can easily degenerate into bitter name-
calling. 
 
 The conflict between “free mining” and impending BLM regulations was the 
central point of my article, “Federal Regulators vs. Nevada Miners: A Review of the 
Proposed Surface Management Regulations” published in 1977.  This chapter will 
explore the origins of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the process of 
implementation, in which legislative intent is transformed into practical reality.  The 
process was not an easy one, given that NEPA was a “feel good” statute which provided 
little guidance to the newly-formed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other 
regulatory authorities.  In fact, upon reading my paper after a thirty-six-year hiatus, I was 
struck by two things: 
 1. Following enactment of NEPA in 1969, the implementation process was 
grindingly slow.  The Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) surface management 
regulations were not adopted until 1980, eleven years after NEPA and four years after 
they were proposed. 
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 2. The four-year period between proposal and adoption of the BLM 
regulations illustrates the reluctance and resistance of the natural resource community 
(and other regulated groups) to accept federal control of private interests.8 
The Scenic Hudson Case: Blueprint for NEPA 
 NEPA is an unusual statute.  It is remarkably brief, and its primary command is 
deceptively simple: federal agencies must study and consider the likely environmental 
impacts of a proposed action before financing, approving, permitting, or taking whatever 
federal action is necessary for the proposed project to proceed.9  NEPA may have been 
triggered by the notorious Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, but its true origin lies in the 
Scenic Hudson case decided in 1965.10  (One of the principal attorneys in the Scenic 
Hudson case was Simon Rifkind of New York City.  I was a student in “The Civil Trial” 
taught by Professor Rifkind at Stanford Law School, and he recalled Scenic Hudson as 
one of the highlights of his illustrious career.) 
 Scenic Hudson dealt with a proposed electrical generating plant on the Hudson 
River.  The Federal Power Commission (FPC) refused to consider the project’s impact on 
recreational and scenic values, among other things.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned the FPC and made four significant holdings: (1) the FPC was required to 
adopt a plan addressing recreational purposes, which included conservation of natural 
resources, maintenance of natural beauty, and preservation of historic sites; (2) the Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference and local towns had standing to obtain review of the 
FPC decision to protect non-economic interests; (3) the FPC failed to give full 
consideration to alternate plans; and (4) the FPC failed to consider all relevant facts in 
compiling its record, including a consideration of all alternatives. 
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 This was a remarkable decision in 1965, particularly with its recognition that 
private parties could protect intangible, aesthetic values.  NEPA’s requirements for 
environmental impact statements (EISs) follow directly from the holdings of Scenic 
Hudson.  Congress was provided with a blueprint for action. 
The Power of Delegation: Regulations under NEPA 
 The text of NEPA occupies seven, single-spaced pages in the U.S. Code.  It was 
adopted with almost no legislative history and little guidance to agencies.  It is 
remarkable in its widespread delegation of authority.  Neither the Council on 
Environmental Quality (another creation of NEPA) nor the newly-formed Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was given authority to enforce the statute.  Instead, the burden 
and responsibility for interpretation and enforcement were delegated to every federal 
agency involved in reviewing, approving, and funding federal projects. 
 The result was a conflicting and confusing body of law reflected primarily in 
judicial decisions.  For example, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, a case 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971,11 a grassroots citizen movement successfully 
required the U.S. Department of Transportation to consider community disruption and 
protection of park lands as a factor in interstate highway design.  The resulting body of 
common law is chaotic even today. 
One must hunt down the scores of court decisions applying NEPA to 
specific projects.  Even these court decisions are of limited utility, for 
they are often tied to the individual circumstances of a particular 
project.12 
 
 NEPA gave rise to a new class of technocrats: environmental consultants.  With 
every agency formulating its own EIS rules, and with every project requiring a site 
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specific analysis, legions of experts arose to satisfy the new requirements.  In 1974, when 
I looked under environmental consultants in the Palo Alto Yellow Pages, there were 
already dozens of companies and individuals ready to provide their services.  NEPA also 
opened a new opportunity for “revolving door” interactions, as regulators moved between 
public and private sectors. 
 Later statutes, notably the National Historic Preservation Act,13 with its 
requirement for cultural and historical surveys as part of an EIS, probably saved the 
academic field of archeology from near extinction. 
BLM Surface Management Regulations 
 In the early stages of my career as a natural resource attorney, I was closely 
involved in preparation and review of mining and geothermal permits.  I no longer 
provide this service because of the diversity and complexity of federal, state, and local 
regulations.  There are professional companies like Enviroscientists of Reno, Nevada 
which specialize in mine permitting, and they have extensive staffs of geologists, 
biologists, right-of-way specialists, and other consultants on staff or on call. 
 However, I have developed three insights regarding environmental permitting.  
First, permitting is very local.  The Council on Environmental Quality may issue broad 
guidelines for preparation and application of EISs, but the staff biologist for the 
Tuscarora Field Office of the Elko District Office of the Nevada Bureau of Land 
Management may be the key to success or failure of a mining venture.  It takes years to 
establish a good working relationship with staff members, and this rapport can be lost 
when the employee is promoted to a new position or transferred to another jurisdiction. 
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 Permitting is very personal.  I was present when an incoming District Ranger told 
a long-established mining client that, “I don’t want mining in my forest.”  A ten-year 
battle of attrition followed; the pumice mine barely survived. 
 The permitting process is also arbitrary, in the sense that staff members of the 
BLM and Forest Service have almost unlimited discretion in applying their agencies’ 
surface management regulations.  Like the traffic policeman who can give a warning or 
citation, the staff geologist can accept a hydrology report or require a $500,000 study 
extending over two years.  These are true “street level bureaucrats” whose expertise and 
discretion give them enormous latitude in wielding their delegated powers.14 
 So the mining industry, which denounced the proposed BLM surface management 
regulations in 1977, had reason for its suspicions.  The miners viewed the draft 
regulations as the thin end of a wedge, and they were right. 
Public Aspirations and Private Property Rights 
 In my UNR seminar on Environmental Law, I ask the following question: Is it 
moral to impose our public aspirations for environmental quality on owners of private 
property?  The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), created by the bi-state 
compact between Nevada and California in 1969, is an example of almost unlimited 
regulatory authority.15 
 The tension between public regulation and private property rights is illustrated by 
the case of Suitum v. TRPA decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997.16  This case dealt 
with TRPA’s total prohibition of development in stream environment zones (SEZs).  Mrs. 
Suitum purchased a lot in the 1970’s for $4,000.00, and the value of the lot had 
appreciated to about $350,000 when SEZ restrictions were imposed in 1989.    
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 TRPA argued that there was no compensable taking.  Ms. Suitum could have 
picnics on her lot (provided that she left no trash or otherwise disturbed the stream 
environment) and she could sell her property coverage rights and building allocation to 
an environmental group for $40,000.00.  The Supreme Court held that the permit denial 
amounted to a form of taking, and TRPA settled for $600,000.00 to avoid a decision by 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that would establish a precedent requiring 
compensation to all SEZ landowners. 
 The Suitum case was unusual because the Court found that there was a “taking” 
under the Fifth Amendment.  Starting with the Penn Central case in 1978,17 the Court 
required a balancing test between governmental actions on behalf of the public and the 
economic impact of regulation on the property owner.  The result was a steady erosion of 
“private” rights, and property owners other than Ms. Suitum have suffered significant 
impairments without compensation.  For example, TRPA has exercised the following 
powers: 
 —   In 1999 TRPA banned two-stroke engines incorporated into jet skis and 
outboard motors.  This action was triggered by research conducted by UNR’s Dr. Glenn 
Miller, who showed that 25% of jet ski gasoline was being discharged into Lake Tahoe.  
Boat rental agencies and private users were required to shift to cleaner four-stroke 
engines. 
 —   TRPA can impose severe coverage limitations on properties with certain 
slope and soil characteristics; as little as one percent of a property may be buildable. 
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 —   Concerned by the proliferation of so-called “McMansions” along Tahoe’s 
shoreline, TRPA adopted new scenic regulations in 2006 restricting height, color, roof 
and wall textures, and window size for new homes and substantial remodels. 
 —   It is a personal issue to me.  My family’s property at Lake Tahoe has been 
devalued by 90% because of TRPA restrictions.  We have no recourse or claim for 
damages. 
Personal Reflections 
 From NEPA to TRPA: how far should we go in imposing societal goals on private 
property?  What are proper limits on regulation and implementation?  These questions 
will be resolved on a case-by-case basis for decades to come, and Lake Tahoe is one of 
the crucibles in which new policies are being constantly forged. 
 As a private land owner, I am ambivalent regarding the conflict between societal 
goals and private property rights.  I live in Caughlin Ranch, which is carefully managed 
by a Homeowner’s Association and Architectural Committee.  I am glad that my 
neighbor does not have a “junker” automobile on blocks in the front yard, but I was also 
irked when I was required to deliver sample bricks to the Architectural Committee for our 
new vegetable beds.  However, I generally find this to be an acceptable balance between 
benefit and burden. 
 In a similar fashion, I have come to view the BLM surface management 
regulations as an acceptable burden.  I was initially opposed to the regulations because I 
felt then (and now) that the BLM could exercise its authority in an arbitrary and almost 
capricious manner.  I have seen projects delayed and denied because of staff 
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incompetence and personal prejudice.  Still, I can be glad that we seldom see the sort of 
activity described in Federal Regulators vs. Nevada Miners: 
Unfortunately, some miners have abused their unique privilege to mine 
freely on the public lands.  Unsightly trenches and dangerous pits show 
a regrettable disregard for scenic beauty and public safety.  And 
although the majority of mining companies voluntarily conduct their 
operations in a responsible manner, there are still a few mavericks 
whose principal exploration tool is the bulldozer.18  
18 
Chapter Three 
Interstate Environmental Problems: 
Water Scarcity and Water Pollution 
 
It broke upon our eyes like the ocean….  The waves were curling in the 
breeze, and their dark green color showed it to be a body of deep water.  
For a longtime we sat enjoying the view….  It was set like a gem in the 
mountains. 
 —  John C. Fremont, upon his first sight of Pyramid Lake19 
 
The only function of Pyramid Lake is to satisfy the thirst of the Sun. 
 —  U.S. Senator Francis Newlands20 
 
 If Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” speaks to global issues of pollution and 
overuse, then the “tragedy of the Truckee River” gives local context to these problems.  
The Tahoe-Truckee-Pyramid ecosystem is a perfect laboratory for examining exploitation 
of a resource.  These interactions were the focal point of Interstate Environmental 
Problems: A Guide to Water Pollution and Water Scarcity, which I wrote as principal 
author in 1974.  It was my first paper on environmental laws and the topic remains 
relevant after forty years. 
The Truckee River System: Water Scarcity 
 The Truckee River is a navigable interstate stream which originates in California 
and terminates in Nevada.  (Please refer to Figure 2 on Page 19.)  The upper Truckee 
River rises in the Sierra Nevada mountains and flows into the southern end of Lake 
Tahoe.  The boundary between California and Nevada runs through the lake, roughly 
bisecting the Tahoe Basin.  At the lake’s outflow point, the Truckee resumes its course 




Figure 2: Truckee River System Location Map 
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Nevada, water is diverted for the use of Reno-Sparks and surrounding farmlands.  The 
river then continues another 50 miles to its terminus in Pyramid Lake. 
 The Carson River system occupies the next drainage basin to the south.  From its 
source in the High Sierra, the Carson River flows 100 miles through the Nevada desert to 
its terminus in Carson Sink.  Like all rivers in the Great Basin, it has no outlet to the sea. 
 The two river systems were joined in 1905.  Water from the Truckee River is 
diverted at Derby Dam into the Truckee Canal and transported to Lahontan Reservoir, 
which also receives flows from the Carson River.  Upon completion of the Newlands 
Project, which irrigates agricultural lands around Fallon, the level of Pyramid Lake fell 
more than 70 feet.  The magnificent Lahontan cutthroat trout vanished in the 1930s when 
the lowered waters, coupled with giant bars of sawdust from Truckee lumber mills, 
denied its access to spawning grounds.  (During this “dust bowl” period, the entire flow 
of the Truckee was diverted to the Lahontan reservoir on several occasions.) 
 The casualties of the Newlands Project included the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 
who had lived on the shores of Pyramid Lake for thousands of years.  They used the 
abundant fish, wild fowl, and game for food and barter.  Politically and economically 
powerless, the Indians were unable to prevent the destruction of their only resource.  
Only recently, as courts and legislatures have become sensitive to the needs of Native 
Americans, has any consideration been given to their eloquent plea: 
You are not content with the damage you have already done.  So long 
as there is a lake, a stream, a forest, a grass land, you must manage it, 
you must dam it, channel it, reforest it….  Can you not leave one thing 
untouched, can you not leave one people alone?  Can you not honor one 
promise?  Can you not respect even one stream, one nearly extinct 
breed of fish, one natural pelican rookery, and one natural lake – the 
greatest of the lakes left from the days of the glaciers?  We have rights 
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– rights to life that you cannot bestow because they were not yours to 
give…  You would take even those from us.21 
 
 One of my first assignments as a new attorney in 1975 was to assist in the Orr 
Ditch litigation, which was the longest continuing federal litigation in U.S. history.  Our 
client was Sierra Pacific Power Company, which supplied water to Reno, Sparks, and 
surrounding areas.  The United States and the Tribe sought to reduce upstream diversions 
in order to sustain Pyramid Lake.  The resulting decrees confirmed the Tribe’s senior 
water rights to water based upon creation of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation in 
1859.22 
 In 1996 the United States, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, the Cities of Reno and 
Sparks, Washoe County, and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection entered 
into the Truckee River Settlement Agreement.  The Tribe had alleged violations of the 
Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and the 
federal government’s fiduciary responsibility to the Tribe.  Reno, Sparks, Washoe 
County, and the United States provided funds to acquire Truckee River water rights to be 
stored in upstream dams and released during dry periods.  (Upstream storage and 
controlled releases provide substantial benefits to Reno and Sparks during periods of 
drought.) 
 The “water wars” are far from over, however.  The Reno-Sparks area continues to 
grow in population, and western Nevada is actively soliciting development and relocation 
of new businesses.  While there appears to be “political equilibrium” at the moment, 
long-term climate change could revive old quarrels.  Data derived from tree rings and 
oceanic sediments confirm that the American Southwest has sometimes experienced 
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periods of drought exceeding 50 years.23  Pyramid Lake is a small remnant of Lake 
Lahontan, a Pleistocene lake that once covered northwestern Nevada and parts of 
northeastern California and southern Oregon.24  Lake Lahontan disappeared primarily 
because of an increase in the evaporation rate as the climate warmed.  Intriguingly, one 
study suggests that Lake Lahonton could return to its Ice Age glory if diversions of the 
Truckee River ceased and precipitation continued at its historical yearly maximum.25 
The Truckee River System: Water Pollution 
 Historically, the city of Truckee (in California) discharged sewage and sawdust 
into the Truckee River, contributing to extinction of the Lahontan cutthroat trout.  As 
recently as the 1970s, the city of South Lake Tahoe discharged sewage directly into Lake 
Tahoe.  Storm water runoff from urban areas (oil, salt, fertilizers, and sediments) remains 
a major problem affecting Tahoe’s water clarity. 
 In 1987 a worker at the Helms gravel pit in Sparks, Nevada noted something 
unusual.  A vivid green band about two feet high suddenly appeared on the southwest 
corner of the pit.  Bacteria were feeding on an erupting face of oil and gasoline, and the 
likely culprit was the Sparks Tank Farm a quarter mile away and due east of John 
Ascuaga’s Nugget.  Subsequent studies disclosed a four million-gallon plume of oil and 
gasoline emanating from the Tank Farm and flowing up gradient to the Helms Pit.  
Fortuitously, the artificially dewatered pit was protecting the Truckee River, which lay 
down gradient.26 
 The discovery of this discharge triggered a cleanup action by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection 
based on the Clean Water Act.27  The agencies had been largely ignored by Santa Fe 
23 
Pacific Pipeline and other operators at the Tank Farm.  EPA and NDEP now demanded 
the attention of their reluctant audience by threatening combined fines of $50,000.00 per 
day.  (Shell Oil Company, which initially refused to participate in the characterization 
and cleanup of the site, was eventually brought to the table when the EPA sent the 
company a bill for $18,250,000.00 in accumulated fines.)  I had a ringside seat in these 
proceedings as legal representative for Air BP, an aviation gas subsidiary of British 
Petroleum. 
 The agencies’ ability to levy significant fines and demand a response was an 
essential element of the Clean Water Act, as amended (“CWA”).  CWA is one of the 
“command and control” statutes enacted by Congress in the 1970s, commencing with the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.  (Please recall the graph of Figure 1.)  It is 
somewhat surprising to realize that there were six prior versions of the Clean Water 
Act.28 
Year Act 
1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
1956 Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 
1961 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
1965 Water Quality Act of 1965 
1966 Clean Water Restoration Act 
1970 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (“Clean Water Act”) 
1977 Clean Water Act of 1977 
1981 Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants Amendments 
1987 Water Quality Act of 1987 
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 The earlier acts were failures because they were more aspirational than effective.  
Water pollution was viewed as primarily a state and local problem, and there were no 
federally-required goals.  The laws enacted in 1956 and the 1960s dealt primarily with 
federal assistance to municipal sewage facilities. 
 The emphasis changed in 1972 with enactment of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments (the “Act”).  The legislation declared two goals: zero discharge 
of pollutants by 1985 and, as an interim goal, water that was both “fishable” and 
“swimmable” by mid-1983.29 The Act has been termed a technology-forcing statute 
because of the rigorous demands placed on the regulated industries to achieve higher 
levels of pollution abatement.  The Act also established the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), which required a permit to discharge any effluent into 
surface waters.  Finally, the Act imposed substantial monetary and criminal penalties for 
violations. 
 EPA and NDEP therefore had sufficient “command and control” to initiate an 
enforcement action and require the offending parties to characterize and clean up the 
underground oil leakage.  The problem was the lackadaisical response of the owners and 
operators of the Tank Farm, who were engaged in a “circular firing squad” of blame.  The 
impasse came to an end when Senator Harry Reid ordered the EPA to find a basis for 
declaring a Superfund action.  (Superfund is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.)  
Curiously, oil pollution is specifically excluded from Superfund jurisdiction.  The EPA 
eventually found traces of perchloroethylene, a cleaning solvent, in the groundwater.  
EPA issued a “Section 106” order directing the Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) to 
immediately investigate the site and submit a plan for intercepting the plume.  The oil 
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companies drilled a curtain of wells on the flanks of the Tank Farm to capture the 
underground oil stream.  At the end of its working life, the pit would be allowed to fill 
slowly over the course of a year or more, and Sparks Mayor Bruce Breslow proposed to 
acquire the pit for a recreational facility. 
 Then came the New Year’s Day flood of 1997.  A series of warm storms dumped 
extensive rain on top of an above-average snowpack in the Sierra, and the Truckee River 
rose seven feet in a matter of hours.  Downtown casinos were surrounded by sandbags, 
and there was heavy flooding in the Sparks industrial area.  Incredibly, the Helms Pit 
filled to its brim within days, and the Sparks Marina was born.  (Insiders referred to it as 
“Lago di Breslow.”)  The oil companies were relieved of their Superfund liability, and no 
fines were levied.  However, a certain level of “pump and treat” continues to prevent 
residual elements of the plume from flowing toward the Truckee River. 
Personal Participation and Observations 
 And what became of Air BP, represented by Richard Harris?  The company and 
its consultants were able to prove that Tank R-35 “tested tight” – neither the tank nor its 
associated pipelines had ever leaked.  The test included a sonogram examination of the 
tank bottom and a magnetic flux exclusion test to determine the Tank’s integrity.  NDEP 
grudgingly entered into a “Stipulation for Dismissal of Air BP without Prejudice,” and 
EPA released Air BP from the CWA/Superfund action upon payment of a “de minimis” 
payment of $25,000.00.  A lead consultant for the Tank Farm cleanup informed me that 
she had never before seen a major party dismissed from a Superfund action. 
 When I wrote Interstate Environmental Problems forty years ago, our family had 
various associations with the Truckee River system.  My father recalled weekly visits by 
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a Paiute tribesman to the Harris family home in Reno around 1910.  On a horse-drawn 
buckboard, covered with wet burlap, were freshly caught Lahontan trout.  A three-foot 
fish, enough to feed a family of nine, could be purchased for ten cents. 
 As noted in Chapter 2, our family has owned property at Lake Tahoe since 1927.  
I served on TRPA’s Advisory Planning Commission for seven years with occasional 
stints on TRPA’s Governing Board as an alternative to Washoe County Commissioner 
Jim Galloway and Commissioner John Breternitz.  I engaged in the Orr Ditch litigation 
and the Sparks Tank Farm cleanup.  I presently serve as a mining consultant to the 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe. 
 Taken together, the Tahoe-Truckee-Pyramid linkage is a microcosm of issues 
found throughout the world.  There will always remain problems of water scarcity, and 
the ongoing drought in our region is an ominous reminder that we depend on a slender 
lifeline of moisture.  Sewage pollution appears to be a problem of the past, but the river 
system will always be vulnerable to contamination and chemical spills. 
 Ironically, the problem that cannot be solved over time is one we have created for 
ourselves.  Lake Tahoe is famous for its clarity, and we strive to preserve its transparent 
beauty.  In doing so, however, we are arrayed against nature itself.  Tahoe is a juvenile 
lake and unproductive in a biologic sense.  Lakes will eutrophy over time – that is, they 
become enriched by sediments, promoting the growth of algae and other life forms.  We 
may temporarily succeed in maintaining Tahoe in an artificial state of suspension, but in 




Superfund: It Can Happen to You 
 
Your clients are having a bad day.  The president of a local bank has 
just learned that a gasoline plume from an abandoned station extends 
under a strip mall financed by the bank; can the bank foreclose against 
the delinquent property owner?  The chief geologist for Ajax Mining 
Company wants to know if the EPA can really force his company to 
clean up mercury contamination from mining operations last conducted 
in 1928.  A real estate developer wants to know whyinhell he should 
pay $5,000 for a Phase I Environmental Audit to refinance his office 
building. All of these clients have one thing in common: they have run 
smack! into Superfund.30 
 
 I loathe Superfund (known more formally as the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act or CERCLA).  It was cobbled together by 
Congress in 1980 as a response to the Love Canal incident.  Its scope was hugely 
expanded by the federal courts, and the law was applied ruthlessly by the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  Innocent landowners were devastated and businesses destroyed. 
 I examined the origins and impact of Superfund in my article, “Superfund: It Can 
Happen to You,” published in the Nevada Lawyer in January 1997 (from which the quote 
above was taken).  My antipathy toward the law was expressed in my Master’s thesis, 
Seek and Destroy: Designation of Potentially Responsible Parties under CERCLA (May 
1994).  I have represented several parties in Superfund proceedings, including Air BP (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). 
The Trigger Event: Love Canal 
 A trigger event, known also as a focusing event, is a “rare, harmful, and sudden 
event that becomes known to the mass public and policy elites virtually 
simultaneously”.31  A trigger event is one of the ways in which John Kingdon’s policy 
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stream is joined with the problem and solution streams.  A trigger event demands 
attention and response, even a badly considered one. 
 Love Canal gave rise to Superfund.  In the 1940s Hooker Chemical Company 
used an abandoned waterway near Niagara Falls, New York as a disposal site for 
hazardous chemicals.  In 1953 the company covered the site and transferred ownership to 
the local school district, which built an elementary school over the old canal.  Children 
suffered scalding chemical burns, and there was a high rate of birth defects.  The 
neighborhood was ultimately abandoned, and Love Canal became a symbol of the 
problems of toxic waste disposal. 
 Congress was generally aware of the problem of “orphaned” waste sites, but there 
had been no consensus regarding remedial legislation.  In the wake of Love Canal, four 
hazardous waste cleanup bills were hastily introduced in the 96th Congress, and 
CERCLA emerged as a last-minute compromise between conflicting House and Senate 
bills.  The lack of coherency and legislative history was noted by the federal courts, 
which bore the burden of interpreting and applying CERCLA.32  The principal policy 
objectives of CERCLA and the federal courts’ role in the process were summarized by 
one federal judge as follows: 
[First, Congress] intended that the federal government be immediately 
given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to 
problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste dispo-
sal.  Second, Congress intended that those responsible for problems 
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and 
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.  To 
give effect to these congressional concerns, CERCLA should be given 
a broad and liberal construction.  The statute should not be narrowly 
interpreted to frustrate the government’s ability to respond promptly 
and effectively, or to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup 
costs beyond the limits expressly provided.33 
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 The key provisions relating to CERCLA enforcement are Section 107, which 
establishes liabilities and defenses for cost recovery; Section 106, which provides 
authority for administrative and judicial enforcement orders; and Section 101, which 
defines hazardous substances.  Superfund places the burden of cleanup on potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) who are present owners and operators, former owners and 
operators at the time of discharge, generators of hazardous waste, and transporters of 
hazardous waste.  The program designed by Congress was intended to shift the burden of 
cleanup from the government to private industry and parties profiting from disposal of 
hazardous waste.  However, the draconian fines and cleanup costs associated with a 
Superfund event resulted in enormous delays and costs, and liability was allocated 
primarily through legal action among the PRPs. 
 Again, litigation is a key concept in the body of law that developed following 
enactment of the statute.  More than a thousand reported decisions were handed down in 
the first ten years after enactment of CERCLA.  The authors of one treatise noted that “At 
the time of this writing [1992], CERCLA-related decisions are appearing at a rate of 
almost one each court workday.”34 
 The hazards of complying with a Superfund order are illustrated by the 
unfortunate example of the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR). 
The $100,000 Cans 
 In 1989 UNR was designated as a Potentially Responsible Party by the EPA.35  
The Order directed twenty-three PRPs to begin an immediate cleanup at a site owned and 
operated by Reno Barrel Recycling (RBR).  For six years RBR had acquired drums 
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containing hazardous waste, which were stored 17 miles north of Reno in Cold Springs, 
Nevada.  The EPA site inspection team found 3,486 barrels in various states of 
deterioration.  The site was located within 125 feet of a mobile home park, and there were 
no fences or security guards to protect the barrels from vandalism.  The owner of the site 
declared bankruptcy and was sentenced to a one-year jail term. 
 UNR was appalled to find itself listed on the Section 106 cleanup order.  UNR 
had never done business with RBR, and the University’s only connection with the site 
were two five-gallon plastic cans with old shipping labels addressed to the University of 
Nevada Chemistry Department.  The cans had originally contained chloroform and 
carbon tetrachloride, but the cans were now filled with a fuel substance.   A handwritten 
label stated that the cans contained JP-4 jet fuel; the label had the name “DeHart” on it.  
The University determined that a former student, Dillard Lovell DeHart, had taken the 
empty containers from a trash dumpster, filled them with JP-4 jet fuel from the Nevada 
National Guard, and used the fuel to conduct tests at the Lear Fan Facility at Stead, 
Nevada.  The cans later migrated to the RBR site.  UNR obtained an Affidavit from Mr. 
DeHart confirming that UNR had not contributed the fuel cans to the site. 
 In 1989 Donald Klasic, UNR’s general counsel, requested that UNR be released 
from the Section 106 order.  Mr. Klasic invoked the “third-party defense” of CERCLA, 
which exempts a PRP from liability if the release of a  hazardous substance was caused 
by “an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, 
or one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, 
directly or indirectly, with the defendant….”36  Since Mr. DeHart was neither an 
employee or agent of UNR, nor acting under any contractual relationship with the 
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University, Mr. Klasic argued that the University should be immediately released from 
the Section 106 order. 
 Despite Mr. Klasic’s request that EPA respond to his letter “as quickly as may be 
possible,” Region 17 took thirteen months to consider his request.  Region 17 rejected the 
third-party defense on the following basis: “EPA has concluded that the information 
UNR submitted to the Agency provides insufficient grounds for release from the Order 
under Section 107(b)(3).  The Order issued to UNR, therefore, remains in full force and 
effect.”37 
 The EPA gave no formal reason for its conclusion that UNR had provided 
“insufficient grounds for release.”  Privately, EPA told the University that it should have 
punched holes in the cans to prevent their further use.  UNR remained liable for cleanup 
because it did not prevent a stranger from collecting the empty cans and using them for 
his own purposes. 
 Faced with the threat of $25,000.00 per day fines and “punitive damages of three 
times the total cost incurred by the United States for site response,”38 UNR joined the 
PRP group which assumed responsibility for cleaning up the RBR site.  The PRPs spent a 
total of $2 million on remediation and attorney’s fees.  Six of the PRPs declined to join 
the cleanup effort despite threatening letters from the EPA and avoided all costs and 
fines. 
 Altogether, UNR expended approximately $100,000 on remediating the RBR site, 
including the time of Mr. Klasic, the University Counsel, who served as Chairman of the 
PRP group. 
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 I later spoke to Mr. Klasic when preparing my Master’s Thesis.  He stated that 
UNR should have denied liability and declined to participate in the cleanup.  He noted 
that other culpable parties, which had demonstrably contributed hazardous waste to the 
RBR site, escaped liability.39 
Lessons from an Inelastic Collision 
 There is an old saying that cue balls are stupid because they never learn anything.  
Their collisions are elastic; they acquire no dents.  It is through inelastic collisions that 
we acquire dents and therefore knowledge.  Based upon the University’s inelastic 
collision with EPA and my own experience with the Sparks Tank Farm, I learned the 
following lessons about Superfund: 
 1. CERCLA imposes joint and several liability on PRPs.  Let us suppose that 
the total liability for a hazardous waste site can be represented by a pie.  Under the 
concept of several liability, the liability is “severed” and assigned to each party in 
proportion to its contribution.  A party which contributed 1% of the waste should bear 1% 
of the cleanup costs.  Assuming for the sake of argument that UNR had any connection 
with the RBR site, UNR could have asserted that its two barrels created a liability for 
only 2/3486ths of the cleanup costs.  Therefore, as a “de minimis” PRP, it should have 
been able to negotiate a settlement and release under the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1984.40 
 2. The barrel recycling fiasco sheds an interesting and somewhat sinister 
light on EPA’s use of Superfund.  The EPA was concerned solely with cleanup of the 
RBR site.  Once it had assembled a sufficient group of “deep pockets,” the EPA was not 
inclined to release UNR, despite its evidence of non-culpability, nor was the agency 
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inclined to pursue the non-contributing PRPs.  “The EPA did not care in the least that its 
actions were inequitable or unfair, but only that the job was accomplished with a minimal 
cost to the federal government.”41 
 3. The EPA could also have argued that UNR was subject to joint liability.  
Joint liability means that the liability of all parties is “joined” together, and one party can 
be forced to bear the entire cost of cleanup even though its contribution may represent a 
fraction of the total pie.  Joint liability is invoked when several parties contribute to a 
release, and where the contribution of one party cannot easily be identified or quantified.  
By allowing imposition of joint liability, the courts gave EPA a powerful tool for 
simplifying a cleanup or seeking cost recovery.  The EPA can name one or more PRPs 
with “deep pockets” and force them to assume the entire cost of cleanup.  The PRPs can 
then initiate a cost recovery action against other parties to retrieve a share of their costs.  
In this manner, a site can be remediated without the use of federal dollars (other than 
costs of administration). 
 4. I have been involved in three subsequent Superfund cases in which the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (acting through the U.S. Forest Service) sent letters to 
Nevada landowners identifying them as PRPs in mining-related cleanup actions. 
 One case involved a family who leased their mining property to a company which 
mined and hauled ore to a processing facility.  The heap leach operation caused a 
discharge of cyanide to the groundwater system, and the claim owners were identified as 
“generators” of a hazardous waste. 
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 In another instance, the owner of an historic mining property was notified by the 
Forest Service that it had failed to contain naturally-occurring arsenic ore (arsenic often 
co-exists with gold), thereby resulting in contamination of an ephemeral stream. 
 In the third case, a party entered into an exploration license with a property 
owner, conducted drilling operations, reclaimed the drill sites, and received a letter of 
commendation from the Forest Service.  The Forest Service now complained that the 
company was a “former operator” of a site exhibiting acid mine drainage. 
 In each of these instances I wrote a letter to the Forest Service stating that my 
client was not properly designated as PRP.  The parties were not responsible as “owners 
or operators” for discharge of hazardous waste.  In no instance did the Forest Service 
proceed with any further action against the clients. 




Nevada Mining: A Successful Model for Resource 
Development 
 
The State of Nevada is the third largest gold producer in the world.  
Most of the gold is derived from open pit mines which can reach one 
mile in diameter and depths of 600 feet or more.  These giant 
operations create issues of dewatering, disposal of waste, mercury 
emissions, and the potential for long-term pollution when the pits fill 
with water.42 
 
 In November 2005 Dr. Derek Kauneckis of UNR’s political science department 
circulated a call for papers from the International Symposium on Society and Resource 
Management (ISSRM).  The program announcement requested papers relating to “global 
challenges and local responses” in resource development around the world.  I was 
intrigued and wrote the following note to my dissertation advisor, Dr. Eric Herzik: 
This will be the “bookend” of my professional papers and 
presentations.  The topic invites the question, “Has the regulatory 
scheme which I have embraced and applied been effective or harmful?”  
It will, in effect, allow me to undertake a retrospective look at my 
career as an environmental attorney and author. 
 
 The format established by ISSRM was a PowerPoint presentation accompanied by 
an oral presentation.  I was assigned to Section D-10, “Human Dimensions of Mineral, 
Oil, and Gas Development.”  The theme of my presentation was “Regulation of Open-Pit 
Gold Mining in Nevada: A Successful Model for Resource Development in the Global 






 In 2006 the State of Nevada was the third largest gold producer in the world after 
South Africa and Australia.  The industry produced 7 million ounces of gold with a value 
of $4.5 billion ($650 per ounce) and employed 11,000 people with an average annual 
salary of $67,000.   
 In 2013 Nevada produced 5.5 million ounces of gold valued at $7.7 billion 
(approximately $1,400 per ounce).43  There were 16,177 Nevadans directly employed by 
the mineral industry at an average salary of $77,321, and it was estimated that another 
65,000 were involved in supplying goods and services to the industry.44 
 On a related note, the Fraser Institute Mining Survey for 2013 ranks Nevada as 
having the eighth most attractive mining policy in the world (Sweden is first) and third on 
its Best Practices Mineral Potential Index (based on “a world-class regulatory 
environment, highly competitive taxation, no political risk or uncertainty, and a fully 
stable mining regime” (Alaska is first).45 
 Aside from Nevada’s excellent mineral potential, why does it remain one of the 
most attractive jurisdictions for mineral exploration and development?  One of the 
principal reasons is the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. 
Nevada Division of Environmental Protection 
 The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) has a unique dual 
mission: “To maintain [environmental] quality…consistent with…the economic 
development of the State” (NRS 445.305).  In contrast to an adversarial attitude toward 
resource development in other states, mining in Nevada is considered a valuable industry 
to be encouraged but closely regulated.  This attitude, coupled with a reasonable level of 
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taxation, results in Nevada’s consistently high ranking for its regulatory climate.  With all 
factors considered, the Fraser Institute’s Investment Attractiveness Index ranked Nevada 
second highest in the world, behind Western Australia.46 
 The organization of NDEP is itself instructive, since it matches the major 
environmental laws with complementary Bureaus:  




Clean Air Act Air Pollution Control 
Air Quality Planning 
 
Clean Water Act Water Pollution Control 
Water Quality Planning 
 
Safe Drinking Water Act Safe Drinking Water 
 
CERCLA (Superfund) Corrective Actions 
 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Waste Management 
 
 An additional subagency, specific to Nevada, is the Bureau of Mining Regulation 
and Reclamation (BMRR) formed in 1989.  The stated goal of BMRR is set forth in 
NDEP’s strategic plan for 2011-2013: 
[To] ensure Nevada’s mining industry complies with State regulatory 
programs for the protection of surface and groundwater resources, 
general pollution control, and reclamation of disturbed lands.47 
 
 The summary page for BMRR’s mission is entitled “Environmentally 
Responsible Mining.”  BMRR pursues this goal in a three-step process. 
 1. Together with the Bureau of Land Management (which administers the 
surface management regulations described in Chapter 2), NDEP requires every 
exploration and mining company to obtain an operating permit prior to commencing 
operations.   (Technically, BLM regulates public lands and NDEP regulates privately-
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owned lands, but the two agencies generally work in tandem.)  The operating permit for a 
substantial mining operating on public land will generally trigger an Environmental 
Impact Statement with evaluations of air and water quality; endangered species and 
historic artifacts; disposal of solid and hazardous waste; and even cumulative impacts of 
the mine on social services (schools, police, etc.) in conjunction with other mining 
activities within the area.  The most difficult permit by far is the “zero discharge” permit, 
which prohibits any discharge of cyanide and other hazardous wastes to the surface and 
groundwater systems.  The combination of EIS evaluations and BLM/NDEP permits 
contribute to a typical seven-year timeline for mine development. 
 2. The permit process requires the operator to disclose and evaluate all 
environmental impacts and mitigation measures.  The Reclamation Plan is a separate 
component of the permit process which describes closure of the mine, the nature of 
reclamation activities, and the cost of completing reclamation (at the highest market rates 
for labor and equipment).  A company will be required to revegetate the reclaimed 
property for at least three years following closure.  In some instances, the mining 
company must establish a water quality monitoring program that will continue decades 
after closure. 
 3. The third step is full funding of the reclamation budget.  The reclamation 
bond must be paid in advance of exploration and mining.  In the past, mining companies 
were allowed to bond a project with a combination of cash and corporate guarantees (in 
effect, promissory notes).  The corporate promises fell short in the gold recession of 
1998-2000, and the BLM and NDEP were left with millions of dollars in unsecured 
reclamation liabilities.  All mining plans must now be fully bonded, which imposes a 
39 
significant burden on smaller companies.  To alleviate this problem, the Nevada Division 
of Minerals has established a statewide bond pool, and a smaller operator can purchase a 
portion of the bond for reasonable premiums and guarantees.  There is some doubt 
regarding the program’s effectiveness. 
The Challenge of Mercury Emissions 
 As Nevada approached 2000, inspectors for the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) identified a new environmental problem associated with Nevada 
gold mining and processing.  In large-scale open pit mining, gold ore is blasted, crushed, 
stacked on giant heaps, and drenched with a cyanide solution.  The cyanide dissolves the 
gold and the “pregnant solution” is delivered to a mill for recovery.  The final product is a 
doré bar of gold, silver, and various impurities.  The doré bar is sent to a refinery for final 
processing. 
 In conducting their inspections of the gold recovery buildings, MSHA inspectors 
found drops and small pools of liquid mercury, known to be a toxic substance.  At the 
same time, there was increasing evidence that vapor emissions from the recovery plants 
were a source of mercury found in Utah and the Great Salt Lake.  According to a report 
published by the Environmental Protection Agency, an estimated 100 tons of mercury 
have been discharged into the environment from Nevada mines over the past 30 years.48  
Of the twelve largest sources of mercury air pollution among U.S. gold mines, eight are 
in Nevada.49 
 In response to this problem, Nevada requested voluntary reductions in emissions 
in 2001, and a number of larger operators began to install carbon absorption equipment.  
However, in order to ensure uniform and universal compliance, the Nevada 
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Environmental Commission adopted statewide regulations in 2006.  The Nevada Mercury 
Air Emissions Control Program requires a mercury operating permit to construct and 
installation of mercury emission controls for thermal units (furnaces and roasters).50  The 
regulations are the most stringent in the Unites States, and they require monitoring, 
testing, reporting, and suppression of emissions at all precious metal mines. 
 However, critics argued that the regulations were inadequate and “would 
effectively rubber-stamp the status quo and provide little actual protection of public 
health and the environment.”51  The Nevada regulations contributed substantially to a 
decline in mercury emissions, but environmentalists were not mollified. 
 On December 17, 2010 EPA promulgated a new federal rule that would reduce 
airborne mercury pollution from U.S. gold mines to about 1,200 pounds a year, a 77% 
reduction from 2000 levels.  According to the Reno Gazette-Journal, “The regulations 
will…protect the health of people in Idaho and Utah who live downwind from Nevada 
mines.”52  The new rule was swiftly enforced in 2013 when the EPA ordered three 
Nevada gold mines to pay a total of $618,000.00 for failing to report release of toxic 
chemicals, including cyanide, lead, and mercury, from 2005 to 2008.53 
Is Nevada a Successful Model for Resource Development? 
 In addition to my practice of environmental law, I have served as legal counsel to 
clients in the mining industry for thirty-seven years.  During this time I have interacted 
closely with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, the Bureau of Mining 
Regulation and Reclamation, and other state and federal agencies.  My clients have been 
significantly impacted by the ever-expanding network of local, state, and federal 
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environmental laws.  It is a fact that the “small miner” has been virtually eliminated from 
the Nevada landscape because of regulatory and bonding requirements. 
 However, I feel that Nevada’s unique “balanced approach” to mining regulation 
has served the State well.  We remain one of the world’s best venues for mineral 
exploration and development.  The Nevada model has been widely emulated, and NDEP 
regularly receives delegations from around the world regarding successful oversight of 
mineral development. 
 My summary page at the ISSRM Conference of 2006 remains relevant and valid 
today: 
 Nevada has adopted a policy that encourages responsible resource development, 
subject to all federal and state environmental regulations. 
 The regulatory and tax climate in Nevada is stable, predictable, and does not 
change with administrations. 
 Nevada recognizes and accepts certain long-term consequences of mining (e.g., 
pit lakes) and bonds for “perpetual” maintenance. 
  Nevada encourages voluntary industry compliance but will enact and enforce 
new standards when appropriate. 
 I believe that the “Nevada Model” remains a suitable guideline for other nations 





Observations and Parting Thoughts 
 
You will study the wisdom of the past, for in a wilderness of conflicting 
counsels, a trail has there been blazed. You will study the life of 
mankind, for this is the life you must order, and, to order with wisdom, 
must know.  You will study the precepts of justice, for these are the 
truths that through you shall come to their hour of triumph.  Here is the 
high emprise, the fine endeavor, the splendid possibility of 
achievement, to which I summon you and bid you welcome. 
 
 – Benjamin Cardozo, Boalt School of Law 
 
 Prior to my graduation from UNR in 1969, and contemplating the possibility of a 
career in law, I visited U.C. Berkeley’s School of Law.  The words of Benjamin Cardozo, 
an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, were inscribed over the entry.  His words 
inspired me then and now. 
The Failed Dissertation Topic 
 I was admitted to the Ph.D. program in Political Science in 1996, following 
conclusion of my Master’s Degree in Environmental Science.  My progress has been 
slow (18 years!), but I was also occupied as full-time attorney, husband, father, and active 
member of the University community. 
 My first dissertation topic proposed a semi-quantitative method for determining 
whether a policy initiative might be successful.  I focused on agenda setting, the all-
important process that determines whether a perceived problem will rise from the 
discussion agenda to the action agenda and finally become a law or regulation.  I 
particularly focused on Kingdon’s three streams of policy formation: 
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 1. The Problem Stream.  Does a problem exist?  Are there alternate and 
plausible explanations? Does the problem suffer from “issue fatigue” (e.g., 
homelessness)?  What are the consequences of inaction, including costs and social 
impacts?  Will international expectations or sanctions play a role? 
 2. The Solution Stream.  Does a solution exist?  Is it technically feasible?  
Can it be enforced?  What are the economic, social, and international impacts of the 
proposed solution? 
 3. The Political Stream.  Is there executive leadership for development and 
implementation of a solution?  Is there a supportive bureaucracy, an agency willing to 
accept and nurture a new program?  Will there be adequate financial resources for a new 
undertaking?  Is there popular (and therefore congressional) support for action?  How 
will the international community regard the program? 
 My proposed matrix assigned a certain point score to each of the major criteria.  
The scores could be positive (popular demand for a program) or negative (strong 
alternative explanations for a problem).  The final score could assist policy makers in 
allocating time and resources to stronger agenda items.  The scheme was applicable to 
fields other than environmental law. 
 In short, I thought to give a certain numerical rigor to Kingdon’s chaotic stream 
theory. 
 Dr. Herzik did not encourage this endeavor, and I turned to other topics.  
However, I would like to resurrect my scheme for the purpose of analyzing two 
significant environmental issues: ozone depletion and climate change. 
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Ozone Depletion: An Unlikely Success Story 
 In 1973 scientists Frank Rowland and Mario Molina of U.C. Irvine began 
studying the effect of chlorine on ozone molecules.  They hypothesized that molecules 
called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could be responsible for massive thinning in the 
ozone layer.  They published their work in 1974 and were later awarded the Nobel Prize 
in chemistry.  By 1985 scientists confirmed that CFCs had created an enormous hole in 
the ozone layer above Antarctica.  The impacts were not immediately apparent, but there 
were strong indications that increased UV-B radiation would cause higher rates of cancer 
in Australia and New Zealand, as well as mutagenic birth defects. 
 The proposed solution was a phase-out of CFCs.  The CFC ban was initially 
opposed by the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, a lobby group aimed at limiting 
research for CFC alternatives funded primarily by DuPont.  However, the chemical 
companies soon discovered (as they had with DDT) that CFC substitutes could be highly 
profitable.  In 1985 the world community adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  The Protocol established a timetable for reduction and 
elimination of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances.  As of 2009, only 2 of 196 
countries participating in the United Nations had not ratified the Montreal Protocol.54 
 The Montreal Protocol is generally considered to be one of the major successes of 
international law.  There has been unanimous recognition among scientists and 
researchers that the Protocol has reduced ozone depleting substances to the extent that 
“natural ozone production processes will heal the ozone layer in about fifty years.”55  
(However, in a somewhat ominous counter development, there are recent observations 
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suggesting that an ozone hole is opening over the Arctic for reasons that are not fully 
understood.56) 
 In retrospect, the unanimity and reaction of the scientific and political community 
is somewhat surprising.  Ozone depletion was remote in time and place and affected only 
a small population.  Why did the world react quickly and positively?  The answer is 
summarized very neatly in an article from Nature: 
Concerns about the ozone layer led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol to 
phase out CFCs.  The discovery of the ozone hole undoubtedly helped 
to seal those negotiations, but there were several other important drivers 
to international accord.  Chemical manufacturers were able and willing, 
after some initial resistance, to produce CFC substitutes.  The public 
was keen to see action: the evidence was strong and clear; the hole 
sounded threatening; and there was link between thinning ozone and 
cancer.  And the public did not feel bullied or threatened – no one was 
telling them to radically change their way of life.  There was a problem, 
and something could be done about it.57 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Global Warming: A Problem without a Solution 
 In marked contrast to the world response to ozone depletion, there is little 
consensus regarding an effective response to global warming.  Indeed, there are those 
who question whether there is a problem; they may be dismissed as contrarians, but they 
are not without influence among U.S. congressional leaders. 
 One of the best known data sets in the world is the “Keeling Curve” based on 
observations of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) taken at the peak of Moana Loa in 
Hawaii.  The curve shows an increase in CO2 concentration from 315 parts per million 
(ppm) in 1958 to a present level of 399.72 ppm as of March 15, 2014.58  The resulting 
“greenhouse effect” is widely associated with increased surface and atmospheric 
temperatures, which lead to climate instability. 
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 There is a vast body of scientific and popular literature relating to global warming 
and its relationship to rising sea levels, coral die-off, disease, desertification, and so forth.  
A useful reference is the Fifth Assessment Report on climate change issued by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2013.59 
 From a personal, policy-making perspective, I offer the following observations 
regarding the sluggish response of the United States and other nations to the issue of 
global warming: 
 1. Unlike ozone depletion, in which the world accepted the evidence of 
remote-sensing data without serious challenge, every person on earth is an expert 
regarding weather, and therefore climate change.  It is difficult to become excited about 
inundation of the Maldives Islands off India when suffering one of the longest and 
coldest winters in U.S. history.  On a personal level, there is no perception of impending, 
worldwide doom.  There is a problem with the problem. 
 2. There is no palatable solution to the “problem.”  For CO2 derived from 
automobile exhaust, coal fire generating plants, and other industrial processes, the answer 
is straightforward: turn off the power, turn out the lights.  CO2 levels would fall to early 
industrial levels, the atmosphere would recover, and we could all enjoy an agrarian 
existence.  Short of that, all efforts at mitigation are half-measures at best. 
 3. The United States is politically paralyzed because there is lukewarm 
support for measures that would seriously inconvenience our lifestyles.  There has been 
no trigger event, and the possible adverse effects of global warming are remote in time 
and place.  There is no political impetus to join an uncertain problem stream with an 
unappealing solution stream. 
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 Incidentally, my point scoring of ozone depletion (with the benefit of hindsight) 
yields a score of about 90 in favor of global action.  My point score for global warming is 
45. 
Final Thoughts 
 Although John Kingdon’s streams join only occasionally, I take great satisfaction 
in the merging of science, political science, and law in my own life.  Each field has led to 
my deeper understanding of the natural world and our relationship to it.  Garrett Hardin, 
the scientist, provided a moral basis for environmental action.  John Kingdon, the 
political scientist, explains why science itself can fail to persuade an uncertain public. 
 When I began my legal career, the “high emprise,” environmental law was in its 
infancy.  Now my students cannot imagine a world without it.  That is progress, and I 
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